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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
('ALVIX M. KFJ}!PF and 
.\IARY B. KEMPF, 
Pla<irdijfs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
JACK II. DJ<:::-.;-TJ<::H and 
OHREA X. DF.NTF;H, 
Defendan-ts and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 9032 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
S'rAT.E:MHlNT OF FACTS 
'fhis nppeal i:,; taken from a verdict of the jury find-
mg that UH) plaintiJTs l1ad fraudulently induced the 
defendants to enter into a certain uniform real estate 
oontract for tllC sale of a motel and cafe knovnt as the 
}'ireside Motel and Cafe at Ephraim, Utah, wherein the 
plaintiffs and appellants were the sellers and the defend-
ants and respondentR were the buyers. A judgment was 
thoreafter entered awarding the defendants tlw sum of 
$1,000.00. 
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In this Statement of Facts we have stated the de-
fendants' ease in the besl possible light and in most 
instances refer direetly to the testimOilY of the defend-
ants. For tlds reason, the facts cannot be controverted 
since the defendants' case ean be no stronger than their 
own testimony. Ray v. Consolidated Freightways, 4 U. 
2ol 137, 289 P. 2d l!J6. 
Jack H. Denter and Ohrea Denter, his wife, nego-
tiated for a period of 14 to 15 months for the purchase of 
tl1e Fireside Motel at Ephraim, "Cial1, from the appellants 
(Tr. 261). Jack Denter was a man of considerable busi-
ness experience having served as the Sales Manager for 
Maycoek Brokerage Company ('l'r 249) and also having 
owned and operated a cafe in Salt Lake City, Utah, for 
approximately eight years (Tr. 212). Mr. Denter had a 
great deal of experience in analyzing business costs and 
recotds involved in such operations (Tr. 250). On cross-
examination Mr. Denter displayed a very apt knowledge 
of cof!ts, methods of computing costs and estimating costs 
from gross proceeds and receipts (Tr. 250, 255). 
'l'he parties finally entered into the sales agreement 
which is the subject of this action on the 26th day of 
August, 1957. Thereafter in the latter purt of September 
tl1e Denter..- moved to Ephraim, t'tah, and took over the 
active operation of the Fireside }fotel and Cafe. The 
Denters operated ihe cafe with the help of !llr. and Mrs. 
Kempf during the months of October, November, and 
J)('Cember of 1957, HI wl1ich time tlwy continually ex-
pressed snlicJaction with tlwir purchase and the opera-
tion of the property (Tr. J26). The Deuters then con-
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tinued to operate tho cafe property for an additional five 
months or an approximate total period of eight months, 
nt which time they sen'ed notice upon the Kempfs that 
they were' rescinding their contract because of the frau-
dulent representations made during the sales negotia-
tions. An action was· filed and the issues were defined 
and the plaintiffs were accused specifically of making 
the following fraudulent representations which induced 
the defendantfl to enter into th<' 1miform real estate con-
tract under which the motel property was purchased 
(Answers to Interrogatories, Record 13, 14). They 
stated that the plaintiffs had miHepresented the fads a>; 
tallows; 
A. 'l'hat. th<'y had no otlu;r sources of income other 
than the operation of the motel and cafe. 
R. That during the operation of the motel tlu·y had 
accumulated in the bank $28,000.00. 
0. That from the operation of the motel and cafe, 
tho profit had been sufficient to pay for the same in full 
m seven years. 
D. That the p1·ofit from the· operation of the motel 
and cafe were sufficient to permit. the plaintiffs to pur-
clmse a new Buick four out of five years. 
E. 'l'hat the operation of the cafe and motel would 
gross the sales price within two years. 
F. That the operation of the cafe and motel could be 
handled by hiring all of the help and it would make a 
profit, 
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G. That the low net for the operation would be 
$10,000.00. 
II. That only !JO per cent of the gross receipts of the 
eafe were reported and the plaintiffs inferred that not all 
of thn funds received in operating tlw motel were 
reported. 
I. 'l'hat the income from thn operation of the cafe 
and motel was sufficient to pay an average payroll of 
approximately $400 and $900 per month and still show 
a good profit. 
J. That the profits from the operation were suf-
ficient tn pay the expenses of sending two children to 
private o;ehool~. 
K. That the plaintiffs' liquor bill alone charged to 
the bw;iuess ran over $1,000.00 a year. 
L. That the plaintiffs were reluctant to sell, but were 
doing so because of the ill health of ~fary B. Kempf. 
Tl1e Kcmpfs denied that the statements were made 
to the defendants. ThC' e\"ideru:c showed tlmt during the 
fourteen to fifteen montho; of negotiationo; between the 
parties on the sale of the properties that the respondent8 
made a good many trips down to YiC'w the properties and 
made inquirieo; of other sales people 11 l10 had stayeJ at 
the property and also examined the booko; and acrounh 
of the appellani ~ concerning the exact income and cx-
pemes of the busi11css. The books were made available 
to them on an.1· reque~t. f\lld upon onP oceasion both re-
~<poudenJ,; examined the books in some detail concern-
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ing the gross income and expenses of the business. Mrs. 
Dent<>r specifically recalled going over such items as exact 
days' n•reipts for tho gross business on certain dates and 
also ,~1wh C'xpensos as the gas bill, electric light bill, and 
salaries ('l'r. 458 to 462). 
The jury impaneled to hear the mat1Pr found for the 
Denters and against the Kemph, and awarded the s11m 
or $7,000.00 to the Deuters. Thi10; appeal is taken from 
tk1t. vNdict und tbe judgment of the Oourt based thereon. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT l. 
THE THl.AL UOUIT "F;RRlGD T~ REFUSING 
TO GRANT A DllH;CTlW Vl"JRDTC'I' l<'OR 'I'LH~ 
PLAIXTIFE'S BI<~LOW AXD FURTlHm 
ERRED I); REF1.JS1XG '1'0 S.!i:l' ASlDJ<] 'l'IIE 
VERDICT OF THE .JURY AND GRANT ,TUDG-
~fEXT IN F .A VOR OF PLAINTIFFS XOT-
WTTHSTAN"DING THE VERDICT. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IX ADMITTING INTO 
FJVIDENCE EXHIBITS AND STATEMENTS 
XOT RELIED UPON BY THE DEFENDANTS 
AXD XOT KNOWN TO THE DEFENDANTS. 
PoiNT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IX AD~HTTIXG 
INTO EVIDENCE EXHIBITS CONTAIXIN"G 
lNFLAMATORY HEARSAY AND CONCLU-
STOXS OF COUNSEL. 
ARGUJI.fE~'l' 
PoiNT I. 
TH}i] 'I'RTAL UOUH'I' ~aunm !N REFLSING 
TO GRA\TT A DIH.l<~CTIW VJ<;IWIC'I' FOR THE 
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PLAIXTIFFS BELOW AND FURTHER 
:BJRR"F:D TN Rf~l<'"C'SING- '1'0 SET ASIDE THE 
VEHDIC'l' OF THE JCRY AXD GRAXT J"C"DG-
1-fENT IN FAVOR OF PLAIX'l'lFl<'S 1'0T-
WITHSTANDIX0 'l'll.bJ V~RDIOT. 
Assuming the representations to have been made as 
testified to by th(• respondents herein an examination of 
tluoJ representations leads to one conclu~ion: The 
reprr~PntatiorJs <•laimrd go to the fact of income from the 
cafe and motel business either directly or indirectly. Mr. 
Denter claims that tlJe representations were anot.her way 
by saying that the amounts of profit from the motel oper-
ation were -;ubstantial. 
EYen asomming arguendo, that the representations 
were made and that they were made for tl1e purpose of 
inJuciTJg the defendants to act, we find neither reliance 
nor any entitlement to rely upor1 those representations by 
the defendants to their injury and damage as is required 
under deeisions of this Court. Pace v. Parish, 122 Utah 
141, 247 P. 2d 273. From the defc11danb' te~timony "~ 
find without contradiction that they, Jack Denter and his 
wife Ohrea Denter, did examine the books of the Fire-
side Motel. Jaek Dente!' tl•stiiird tl1at he examined the 
hooks to some extent on at least h1'0 oerfl~ions. Ol1rea 
Denter testified that she spent some time in the company 
of her hushnnd and one of the sellers, :lfary Kempf, in 
('JuJmining the book" nnd parti<:>ularly books concerning 
\rage items, sales item~. a gaH hill, eled.ric light bill, and 
that thr~· examiw•d particularly indiYidual day receipts 
('T'r. 4581.o 462). :\lrH. DPnter the11 stnted that she did not 
go thro11~h the books thoroughly, lmt tl1at she did <:>:.::amino 
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item by item certain days' receipts and did comment 
upon them and discuss them with her husband and Mary 
Kempf; that ;;he and :Jlary Kempf left the room and left 
the books witl1 Calvin Kempf, Jack Denter, and a sales-
man by the name of Broome. The defendant01 did not 
rPI_v u!'on any of the alleged statementR or repreRentationR 
claimed to have been made by the plaintiffs. They made 
an independent investigation and had all of the facts 
open to them upon the investigation. Under these cir-
cumstances the buyers cannot be heard to say tlntt they 
hall a right to rely 011 representatl011s they uno:lcrtook to 
in'C'-~ligute and vcril"y themseln'S, pariirularly where all 
the information wn~ nvailahlr i.o thf'm (Am .. Tur., VoL 
2:;, Fraud & Deceit, Sec. 14i). 
1'he repr1·~~·n1<·~· cannot as;;ert fraud when he closes 
his eyes in order not to "''(' it; he must take some prceau-
tion against being deceiveo:l by those with whom l1e deals. 
Pace v. Par·ri8h, s11-pra, Annotation: 61 ALR 511. The 
defendants below and respondents here ha..-e not proved 
by clear and convincing evidence that they relief upon 
a11y of the alleged representations made by the plaintiffs. 
Par-e v. Pa.rish, snpra, Conversely, tlw evidence of the 
respondents convincingly dC'mOIIsi.rate~ that they did not 
rely on tlw pl1Jinti1Ts but insisted upon an examination 
of their hooks wl1icl1 wNe an accurate record of the plain-
tilTs' bm!ine;;~ activity; and that the defendant Jack H. 
Dente-r had sufficient experience to eleal']y uno:let·stand 
the hooks and records and to interpn~t Hwm in tlw ligl1t 
of his experience with a similar ty]Je lin~iT'<'~~- Th0 major 
part of tl1e recei;-'t~ of the I<'irc~side i.:J.I"P nnd }{ole! \\erf' 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
from the caft> operation, a type of operation in which l\lr. 
and _}f rs. Denter had been connected for the past years 
m Salt Lake City. 
Even assuming that the representations enumerated 
in 1he Statement of Facts were made, the defendant~ have 
no l·ight to close their eyes and accept unquestioningly 
any representations made to them but they l1ave the duty 
to make such investig-Hiion of inquiry as reasonable <'are 
under the circumstances would dictate. And in this ease 
sueh iliVcstigation was made. The duty of a reasonable 
man nuder such circumstancef! as is discussed in detail in 
the case of T,euis et al v. While, et al, 2 "Gtah 2d 101, 269 
P. 2d 865. No m'dtcr how naive or inexperienced the 
defendants were, they conld not close their eyes and accept 
unquestionably any representations made to them. It 
was their duty to make such investigation and inquiry 
a~ reasonable care under the circumstmJces would dictate. 
There being no evidence whatsoever disputing tlw 
respondent~' independent investigation tlH•;• are pre-
cluded, as a matter of law, from recovery, and the rna iter 
should not have gone to the jury. 
A ~;ccond novel situation is presentPd m this case 
~;ince the buyers took possession of the propert;> and all 
its benefitl:i and operated it for a period of eight months 
before electing to n':-wiud their contrart. 'l'his ca~r falls 
within the well ~et 11ed rnlP that the right to eled to 
rescino:l fl contract on the ground of fraud mu~t l1e {'X£'1'· 
cised promptly upon diHl"OYPr.\· of the fraud and that any 
d,•lay \\"l1il"ll is inconsistent with the degrrl' of promptnes~ 
required l1y the circumstances is a bar to relief and con· 
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stitutes a defense to the proceedings (24 Am. Jur., p. 32, 
Sec. 208). The defendants, buyers of the Fireside Motel 
and Cafe, took active possession of the property the latter 
pmi of September and a<:tively operated it during the 
months of October, November, and December of 1957, 
after w!Ji(·!J period of time they made the first infltallment 
payment due under the uniform real estate contract, Ex-
hibit 1, of $1,350.00, which payment was made in .January, 
1958, by the defendants to the plaintiffs shortly after its 
due date of December 31, 1957 (Tr. 327). Du6ng this 
period the defendants took all of the benefits of the oper-
ation and on many O<'rasions expressed satisfaction with 
t li(' business to the plaintiffs who were then assisting them 
11·ith the operation. The follov.ing is a portion of the 
transcript shown at pages 326 to 327: 
CROSS-EXA1IINATTON-JACK II. DENTER 
Q. Yes. Then in your opinion, $35,000.00 gross 
would have been bad business! 
A. That is right, sir. With t.he expenses and my 
private expenses, such as Dentist bills and that, 
I don't think it would carry it. Yes sir, I think it 
i~ bad. 
Q. Now ~1r.- excuse me just one minute. 
A. Yes sir. 
Q .• \fr. Denter, did you discuss tllC business of 
the mokl witl1 Mr. and 1"1 rs. Kempf during the 
monU1s of October, No\·emher, and December 
of 19571 
A. Xot in the way of business. \Ve just worked 
together. I don't think there was anything that I 
can recollect that there was anythi11g. J was pleJJty 
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satisfied with the business at that time, because 
it was a good huRiness at that particular time. 
Q. As a matter of fact, did you tell them that You 
were satisfied wiih the business1 
A. At t11at particular time, yes. 
Q. And did you tell them that you lliked the 
town1 
A. I certainly did. 
Q. And you liked your customers! 
~'\. That is right. 
Q. And that you appreciated their helpf 
A. That is right. 
Q. And- did you - you told them on numerous 
occasions during the month of Octobei, November, 
and December, iom't correcU 
A. Yell. 'l'hat I appreciated their help, I sure did. 
Q. Y0s. Now duri11g the month of January, did 
you llfl.\"f~ any discussions wit\1 ~fr. and Mrs. 
Kempf concerning the business? 
A. Xosir,Ididn't. 
Q. During the month of January, you made your 
quarterly payment which was due the last of De-
cember, illn't that correct? During the month of 
January, you made a payment on the contracH 
A .. Tha( was for October, November, and Decem-
ber of 1957. 
Q. Tha( iH right. 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you made it in the latter part of January! 
A. That is right. 
10 
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Q. And at that time you were satisfied with the 
business 1 
A. That is right. 
Q. Now when did you first become dissatisfied 
with the business 1 
A. About .\farch. 
Under tl1eJ:Je circumstances aml for a period of eight 
months the defondant.s continued to treat the eontraet as 
valid and tlll' properly as tlwir own and continued to per-
form under t.he contract. Their eonduet was such as to 
ratify and confirm the entire contract if we could assume 
that they had the alternative of rescission available to 
them. It further appears that if their gross income from 
the period were extended for a full calendar year, their 
income would lm\·e exceeded $35,000.00. This sum is con-
siderably in excef!s of the minimum of $30,000.00 the 
plaintiffs represented the business had grossed in past 
yl•ars. The evidence was that the dGfGndants repeatedly 
affirmGd the contract and they therefore cannot now be 
heard to demand reselssion. A similar fact situation 
appeared in the landmark case of Crymes v. S(ffiders, 93 
U.S. 05, 62, where the court used the following language: 
* ' ~ \V11ere a party desires to rescind upon the 
ground of mistake or fraud, he must, upon the 
discovery of the facts, at once announce his pur-
pose and adhere to it. If he be silent, and con-
tinue to treat the property 11s his own, he will be 
held to haw• waived the objeetiou, mtd will be 
conclusively bound by the contrad, as if the mis-
take or fraud had not Ol'curred. He is not per-
mitted to play fast and lonse. Delay and vacilla-
tion are fatal to the right whidt had before sub-
11 
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~ - · ''. sistca. ·'Phose remar)rs are peculiarly a-pplicable to 
speculative propmty like that here in question, 
which is liable 10 large and constant fluctuations 
in value. " * * 
lil 'fidditioii to the evidence which developed during 
the course of the trial, it should be noted that Exhibit 3, 
the uniform r0al estate contract entered into by the par-
ties, includes the foJlowing provision: 
lt is hereby expressly understood and agreed by 
the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said 
property in its present condition and that there 
arc no representations, eovcnants, or agreement~ 
between the parties ·herewith with refcrenee to said 
property eseept as herein specifically set forth or 
attached hereto. 
The parties expressly contracted against any warranties 
or representations which were beyond the contract itself. 
'l'he defendants cxpresJ>ly aelrnowlcdged satisfaction 
thereby with their own· investigation. 
PoiNT II. 
THE COGR'l' ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO 
EVIDENCE. EXHIBITS AND STATEMENTS 
NOT RELIED UPON BY THE DF.FT:KDAKTS 
AKD XOT KNOWN TO THE DF.FF.XDA)J'l'S. 
Over objection (Tr. 111, Tr. 130) of the plaintiffs, the 
Tl'ial Court allowed into evidence Exhibit No. 12 which 
was a listing card on the Fin'side \fotel and Cafe at 
gpl1raim, Utah, whi('h IYHS gi1·cn to the Klinger Realty 
Company on September 15, 1955, and which expired De-
cember 1\ 1 ~);,.·1. The T ,isting Agreement was never seen 
hy l\fr. or ::\frH. Denter, nw1 for that reason was never 
relied upon by them. The exhibit was damaging and 
12 
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prejudicial to the plaintiffs in that it had a gross income 
ligttre of approximately $38,000 to $50,000.00. The cvi-
deuce developed that the gros,., ill<'omc of the business had 
h''I'Tl in the ar{'H ol' $30,000 to $35,000.00, which gross was 
in fnll arr.ord with the exhibit actually seen by J\.h. and 
~Irs. Denter (l<ixl1il•it 13) which represented the gross a~ 
between $30,000 and $!10,000.00. 
The Court further erred in allowing evidem·f' o''er 
the objection of coumel that statements had been made 
l•y );[ r. Kempf to one of the Hale>;men of Klinger Realty 
that, it looks like they would make $60,000 armnally on 
the place. 'l'he sN•rdary, :\'Irs. Virginia Brown, elaim,•d 
that she ov<>rheanl this st.a terrl('nt being made but tlmt she 
was in another room and did not. know exactly the con-
lll'l'tinn in which the statement was made (Tr. 113, Tr. 
115). l<'uri\"'1", :\'lr. Kempf was cross-examined in regard 
to a $60,000.00 statement.. 'I'be prejudieial effeet this evi-
dN!ee had on the jury was that it led them to believe that 
Jir. Kempf had a propensity to make fictitious state-
ments 11bout the business and it would influence the jury 
to be more likely to believe the statements the defend-
ants sairl tJw plaiiltiffs made. The statements were never 
~hown to haw· influenced tl1e defendants, as a matter of 
fa(•t they were not known to tlw defendants. The rep-
reNentations which wrre allowed in evidence were also 
heyond the pleadings in 1lw case contrary to the require-
ment. imposed by R11l(' 9B, Utah R.ules of Civil Procedure, 
requiring allegaiit_•m of fraud to be pleaded specifically. 
The plaintiff.<; had no notic:e of thec;e charges or allega-
iinns and the immaiNial matter~ were brought before the 
13 
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jury to inflame and prejudice them. It is entirely possible 
1lntt the entire decision of tho jury was based upon tliese 
itemR. 
PoiNT TIL 
THF. TRIAL COUHT .I!a'tHJllD IN ADMITTING 
lN'l'O J£VIDENCE EXHilliTS CON'l'AJKTNO 
INFLAMATOR.Y HEARSAY AND CONCLV-
SIOXS OF COUXSFJL. 
Over objection of plaintiffs' attorneys the Trial 
Court allowed into eYidenee Exhibits 8 and 9, which were 
letters of council direded to the plaintiffs which were in 
such language as to prejudice a jury. TlnJ exhibits have 
the dfcet ol" ~,'"iving conclusions of counsel baRed on lJCar-
say evidence, l.he status of admissible evidence which 
would entitle the jury to give that evidence substantial 
weigllt and upon which they could base a decision. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we Rubmit that the Trial Court erred in 
failing to grant the plaintiffs'-motion for a directed ver-
dict, and further in failing to grant the plaintiffs' motion 
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury. 
As a matter of law the defendants "·ere not entitlrd to 
plaee any reliam''' on representations alleged to have 
h('en made, and further tlw defendants affirmed and rati-
fied the contrad l1)· their subsequent conduct. 
H(·.~lll'l'! full~- submitted 
ou.:;J•j:\ AND CIIA~IBERLAIN, 
A tton1C,1fS for I' Ia in I iff s. 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
